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This thesis describes the conceptual background and the main prob-
lems encountered in force-structure planning. The model structure of
the "Tactical Air War Analysis Game" (TAWAG) is reviewed and improve-
ments and enrichments are proposed. Based on experience from trying
to implement this model on the computer of the Naval Postgraduate School,
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Due to fiscal limitations, defense decision-makers are always con-
cerned with the problem of allocating limited resources to certain pro-
jects or weapon systems. The goal is to maximize the effectiveness of
existing forces by either reorganizing them, developing new doctrines or
procuring new weapon systems. It is easy to find examples in history
that the improvement of the effectiveness of one military force due to
the implementation of "better" systems forced the opponent to employ
countermeasures against the perceived new threat, thus starting what is
now known as an "arms race". Improvements in efficiency seem to
foster this process. On the other hand, one can argue that it is--at
least theoretically—possible to contain an arms race by means of
thorough investigation and objective analysis of the capabilities and
possible options of both sides involved. This would lead to a reason-
able assessment of force-balance conditions and this in turn may result
in ending an arms-race. It even might help to reduce forces through
mutual agreement on the results of that analysis.
Some of the most often encountered resource allocation issues are:
[Ref. 1: p. $
- How to assess the capability of a possible opponent and how large
should the military forces be to meet the perceived threat?
- What is the (optimal) force structure overall?
(Army - Navy - Air Force)

- What is the (optimal) force structure with respect to service
branches?
(Infantry - Tanks - Artillery)
- What is the (optimal) force structure with respect to service
specialties?
(Personnel Support - Logistics)
- What new weapon systems are necessary to close perceived gaps in
technological developments?
(Physical specifications, number, tactical use, C -context)
These resource allocation problems are not new, they were principally
the same throughout history [Ref . 2] . Different operation plans and
changing situations, geopolitical ly as well as on the battlefield, re-
quire reorganization of forces with varying urgency. The skill of the
military decision-maker is --among others --the ability to select out of
the huge number of different possibilities of force aggregations the one
which is properly suited to match the task.
Usually the decision made is based upon decision rules which reflect
the educational background of the decision-maker, as well as on his ex-
perience; e.g., a decision-maker educated in physics or engineering
might use concepts or models used there to find a solution for the
problem at hand, although the situation he encounters might be obscured
by factors not related to physical phenomena. For the problem of
analysis versus judgment, see Stockfisch [Ref. 1: p. 4] .
In spite of the organizational levels at which the problems are
encountered, they almost always are characterized by the same type of
structure of antagonistic objectives. This structure principally

consists of interaction processes of measures and counter-measures applied
with consideration of own resources and possible reactions of the opponent,
This depicts a situation typical for games. Game theory [Ref. 3] focuses
on such antagonistic situations. Decision making with conflicting objec-
tives has been modelled by the paradigms of game theory. Game theory
addresses both static situations (normal form of game) and dynamic situa-
tions (extensive form), and the latter is more germain to modelling of
military campaigns as frequently done in defense planning. This leads to
interest in differential games. (For the theory of differential games,
see Isaaks [Ref. 4]
.)
It is therefore not surprising that for a long time in history games
have been used as devices to enhance the training of present and future
military decision-makers. War games were also used for the analysis of
military problems. For a short history of military games, see Huber
[Ref. 5: p. 24] and McHugh [Ref. 6]. The introduction of electronical
data handling devices has increased the speed of calculations and thus
enabled the decision-makers to use combat modelling and war games as de-
cision aides for routinely encountered problems. It has also furthered
their use as educational media and analytical tools.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THESIS
Modern aircraft with their potentially devastating firepower on the
battlefield, and with their ability to reduce reaction times to sudden
threats, as well as their inherent capability to be concentrated to form
locally and timewise limited air superiority, play an important role, not




Development of an "optimal" doctrine and exact planning of "optimal"
allocation is therefore paramount. These problems foster highly sophis-
ticated, scientific methods. To reduce the risk of decisions, these
methods will have to be constantly refined and improved.
The long lead-times for the development of weapon systems and the
high cost involved in design, construction, procurement, and maintenance
have led to ever-increasing demands for analysis. These investigations
have mainly been concentrated on the following two aspects: [Ref. 7: p. 5]
- long-range planning concerning operational design of future aircraft
and
- short-range planning concerning the mission assignment of currently
procured systems.
Additionally, these efforts are undertaken to prolong the operational
"lifetime" of weapon systems to reduce overall costs.
To reduce these possible costs, the "Tactical Air War Analysis Game"
(TAWAG) was designed by Taylor and Huber in 1979 [Ref. 7] and later de-
veloped by students of the Armed Forces University in Munich, West
Germany (Hochschule der Bundeswehr, Muenchen). It models a conventional
conflict on theater level, e.g., Central Europe. It can be understood
as a framework of hierarchically structured sub-models on different
levels of abstraction. TAWAG enables the researcher to study the influ-
ence of the variation of deployment strategies of air war systems on the
results of ground war.
This thesis describes the conceptual background of TAWAG, reviews
the model structure and purposes improvements and enrichments. Based
on experience gained from trying to implement this model on the computer

system of the Naval Postgraduate School, the author makes recommendations




A. MEANS OF INVESTIGATION
The military analyst is usually concerned with one of two problem
areas: (1) the long-term planning of force structures or (2) the short-
term problem of maximizing the effectiveness of currently available
forces. Both problems require some form of modelling of military opera-
tions, although the sets of constraints will be different in each of the
two cases. Huber proposes the use of three interacting categories of






FIGURE 1: Interacting Categories of Analytical Tools
Hierarchical research games are modelled to represent the interac-
tions between the different levels of military environment in combat.
They are usually very detailed and need to be complemented by Quick
Games, representing the higher levels of the hierarchy, in order to
save time when parametric analyses are made on these higher levels.




There exist two principal ways to create models for analysis: data-
driven ("bottom-up") and concept-driven ("top-down"). Bottom-up analysis
takes technical data of weapon systems, physical constants and mathemati-
cal principles and aggregates them through different levels of analysis
to a final result. This is the way how, for example, the outcome of an
engagement of tank versus anti-tank weapon is modelled. Taking the time
necessary to detect and identify the tank as a valid target and the time
to aim and fire the weapon, as well as ballistic data of the anti-tank
weapon, the probability of hitting the target can be calculated. Taking
a (pseudo-) random number, the model can actually predict, if the tank
is killed or not. Manual war games and stochastic or deterministic sim-
ulations are examples for this method of modelling. The important aspect
is that the model is connected to the reality through the use of techni-
cal or physical data.
The top-down approach is different in the way that it uses mathemati-
cal representations of the effects of sets of weapon systems instead of
representing the physical attributes of each individual weapon. The
outcomes of military encounters can be determined by manipulating mathe-
matical expressions rather than simulating physical interactions. The
most prominent models using this approach are the different forms of the
Lanchester equations. The principal difference between data-driven and
concept-driven analysis is depicted in Fig. 2.
Modelling of air war operations in the context of an ongoing ground
war poses specific problems. Usually the levels of aggregation are an
order of magnitude apart. Ground war modelling at theater level is





















FIGURE 2: Data-Driven Versus Concept-Driven Modelling for Analysis
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of weapon systems. Air war has to be modelled on the level of an indi-
vidual weapon system because of the range, firepower, and ability to
fight individually or in large numbers.
The Tactical Air War Analysis Game (TAWAG) presented later in this
thesis recognizes these differences.
1 . War Gaming and Simulation
The means of analytical investigation depend on the object of
interest. Huber identifies three main areas of military activity
[Ref. 5: p. 36]:
- Training (T)
- Command and Control (C)
- Planning (P)
Considering each of these areas as the set of all functions and activi-
ties performed, they can be depicted as in Fig. 3 below.
FIGURE 3: Military Activities (see Text)
Training and Command and Control deal with existing forces,
and since both functions are performed ^/ery often by the same individuals,
the intersection of T and C exists. Planning is performed for the future,
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taking the present force as a basis, and since the problems for decision-
makers are principally identical in both areas, C and P, the intersection
of C and P exists.
Each of these three areas fosters different means of investiga-
tion:
- War games --assisted and supplemented by field exercises--are
used as a training device in T.
- War games and simulations are used in C.
- Analytical models are the primary investigative tools in P.
All three areas are interdependent and the use of the respective re-
search tools is done in an interactive manner as depicted in Fig. 4
[Ref. 5: p. 41]
.
Military reality can generally be modelled by war games. This
insight gave rise to the earliest war games in history, the most promi-
nent of which is Chess. It, in turn, is based on the earlier Tschaturanga,
whose origins can be traced to about 2000 B.C. in the Indochinese culture.
For more information about the historical development and the use of war
games, refer to Huber [Ref. 5: p. 24] .
All through history, war gaming was used to train future military
decision-makers. It was used also to gain general insights into the
nature of war. The principal features of war games are their antagonis-
tic character and the fact that humans interact in the decision-making
processes as players and sometimes as umpires. This implies that war
games --whether computer-assisted or not--are usually not a feasible
means of systematic research, since the results which often depend on












FIGURE 4: Interactive Use of Research Tools
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always reproduceable. The necessary consumption of usually scarce re-
sources, like personnel and time, makes the analysis of different al-
ternatives in the course of gaming actions almost always infeasible.
War simulations—since they represent, as the name implies,
all minute details --are analog models of military encounters. The ef-
fort of bookkeeping of all the details has been facilitated by the in-
troduction of fast digital computers. There exist machine-simulations
and simulations with human interaction. Simulation is probably the
most widely used means of military analysis, notwithstanding the fact
that there exist profound problem areas like the notorious line-of-
sight establishment. In the military environment, Monte Carlo Simula-
tions are widely used to model random events like infantry fire-fights.
Simulations are particularly useful for the studies of these small-scale
encounters, since they contain lots of details, which in turn necessi-
tate large data bases and significant amounts of computer time. Addi-
tionally, the establishment of these models, their adjustments to
varying research topics and the maintenance of the data bases are rather
expensive and time consuming.
2. Mathematical Modelling
Analytical models are characterized by two main features:
- the lack of human participation during runs
- the transparency of their structures.
The first feature facilitates run-to-run reliability, e.g., results can
be reproduced simply by using the original inputs. Historically, the
first analytical model consisted of the set of differential equations
proposed by Lanchester in 1914 as a mathematical formulation of combat
17

engagment between two homogeneous forces in an attempt to justify the
principle of concentration under "modern" war conditions.
In contrast to the aforementioned Monte Carlo simulations, which
are used exclusively for small-scale encounters, Lanchester-type models
have been implemented successfully for the whole spectrum of combat ac-
tivities, from company-sized units up to theater-level operations.
These models are one of very few feasible approaches for assessing attri-
tion at division level and above. Using numerical approximation tech-
niques, today's models of theater-level warfare can be used to gain
insights in the dynamics and dependencies of these combat actions.
B. LARGE SCALE MODELLING
1 . Firepower-Score Representation Versus Monte Carlo Simulation
a. Firepower-Score Representation
The concept of firepower-score or firepower-index arises
from the fact that ^ery rarely --if at any time at all --military opera-
tions were performed with only one type of weapon system on each side,
but rather with a mix of different weapon systems, the combination of
which often turned out to be crucial for the success, e.g., Hannibal
used not only a combination of swordsmen, archers, and chariots--those
were known to the Romans too --but also elephants, which gave him the
edge at Cannae (218 B.C.).
Implicit in this kind of approach are the ideas of "capa-
bility", "power", "effectiveness" or "utility". "Firepower" is often
used as a surrogate for these, although the word can be misunderstood.
The central issue, however, is that conventional military operations
involve the combined use of different specialized forces and that this
18

requires evaluation in the context of a given scenario. This evaluation
provides the ingredients for an index number.
The terms "firepower-score" and "firepower-index" should not
be used interchangeably, because the first refers to the military value
of a single weapon system, whereas the latter refers to an aggregation
of different weapon systems and their combined military value Ref. 8 .
Although many firepower-score methods claim that the numerical value of
the "score" of a certain weapon or weapon system is determined as the
product of a measure of the single-round lethality and the expected ex-
penditure of ammunition or other resources during a fixed period of









Rifle M16, 5.56mm 6000 1 6000
MG M-60, .3 cal 150 6 900
MG M-2, .5 cal 250 10 2500
Mortar, 81mm 50 20 1000
Howitzer, 155mm 50 40 2000
Tank M60A2 200 100 20000
Total Firepower-Index: 32640
(from: [Ref. 8: p. 87])
In large-scale combat modelling, the fire-power indices are




- determination of engagement outcomes
- assessment of casualties (or rather their equivalent in
firepower indices)
- determination of front-movement
This is usually done in two successive steps; firstly, the aggregation
of forces is made to determine a total firepower index for each side and
the force ratio of the indices of attacker and defender, and secondly,
the determination of mutual attrition. The latter involves considera-
tion of parameters like engagement type, terrain and breakpoints. The
concept of breakpoints will be explained later. To determine precisely
the losses of a particular weapon system, some method of disaggregation
has to be employed.
The index number can be viewed as one way to reduce the com-
plex problems that a military force planner encounters to a practicable
size.
b. Monte Carlo Simulation
In general, Monte Carlo Simulation is being applied to model
small units' actions like infantry fire-fight, anti-tank versus tank or
air-defense versus aircraft encounters. Usually, the weapon effective-
ness is derived from technical performance data like rate of fire,
weapon accuracy and others. By means of conditional kill probabilities
describing ordnance effects, kill ratios are calculated. This process
usually includes detailed models of detection, identification and tar-
get selection. For more details, see the Engineering Design Handbook
[Ref
. 9] .
Modelling in detail produces very complex structures. How-
ever, the final product is often more credible to many users--
20

especially on decision-maker level—apparently because it contains more
detail and the inherent assumptions are not apparent (e.g., the often
encountered question of a decision-maker: "how do you play smoke?"...).
For the same people, however, these models are far too complicated to
understand. In addition, they require huge amounts of data as inputs.
The source of these data and their updating are of utmost concern for
the user of these models and much dedication and detailed knowledge has
to be exercised to solve the inherent problems. The use of data re-
ceived from the manufacturers of weapon systems without further investi-
gation may well lead to deceiving results. A degradation of performance
data under operational conditions should be expected. Field trials
might be better suited to produce the required data, but this is usually
expensive and time-consuming and therefore not always feasible.
The issue of "validity" --often brought up by proponents of
detailed modelling—has to be addressed. It is very difficult to in-
clude important factors like combat experience or bravery in the detailed
model. Comparison with historical data is rarely helpful, since:
- these data are usually not available in the necessary de-
tail (after all, in our society, it is not acceptable to
begin a war just to collect data) and
- many studies are concerned with future weapon systems so
that historical data are not available at all. For more
details about data base problems, see: Models, Data and
War, Report to the Congress [Ref . 10]
.
One way to model large scale combat using high-resolution
Monte Carlo Simulations is the method of "fitted parameter models", the
21

principle of which is depitced below in Table II. For more examples of
the use of Monte Carlo Simulations, see Tschujew [Ref. ll] and Wentzel
[Ref. 12: pp. 309f] . For a soviet view of the use of Monte Carlo Simu-
lations as training device, see Wentzel [Ref. 12: pp. 318f].
TABLE II
Fitted Parameter Model (from: [Ref. 8: p. 48])










The planning of conventional forces using mathematical
modelling and statistical methods is quite common. Combat modelling
can be done using different approaches, depending on the scope of re-
search and on its objective. Detailed models treat specific combat
interactions, whereas aggregate models are used for large scale confron-
tation problems and for planning purposes. Some of the key issues are
listed below and discussed:
- the firepower index as well as the underlying concept is
highly controversial. It usually fails to consider the
synergistic effects of combining military units when
these units are composed of different weapon systems.
The resulting numbers are said to be "valid" only when
used in large-scale modelling. The concept of linearity,
or equivalently of additivity, of different inputs is
questionable. But because of the ease of application and
the inherent advantage that the necessary data-bases are
smaller, firepower-score representation will be used as
one major means for analysis.
- Monte Carlo Simulation, especially in detailed small-scale
modelling, is useful as a tool to gain insights in the
"micro-cosmos" of war. Additionally, it can be used to
verify higher level firepower-score representations. Monte
Carlo Simulations are better suited to model details of
real -world combat activities, although one has to be aware
of their biggest disadvantage, which is the necessity to
23

establish and maintain large data-bases. This implies,
depending on the programming language used, excessively
long running times because of a multitude of look-ups in
data files.
As Taylor suggests [Ref. 8], detailed models should be used
as analytical tools and as aides to determine basic relationships, while
simple aggregated models should be used to communicate with decision-
makers.
2. The Resource-Allocation Issue and the "Military Production Function"
"The principal shortcoming of the firepower-score approach is its
linear quality" [Ref. 1: p. 79] . One could get the firepower-index in
Table I also if one employed 32640 soldiers, each of them carrying an Ml
6
rifle. This implies that each of the inputs is a perfect substitute for
any other. If this were the case in reality, the problem of optimizing
the structure of any military force would be almost trivial. Depending
on the constraints, one would employ only the input with the highest mar-
ginal product, the highest value of the quotient of firepower-score and
cost, commonly called "the biggest bang for the dollar". The resource
allocation problem like an "optimal" weapons mix would not exist at all,
because there would not be any mixed force.
Reasoning that the marginal product of any input might not be
constant, leads to the economic theory and, in particular, to the theory
of "production functions". If it were possible to establish a "military
production function" and if its form and coefficients were known, the
solution for the problem of computing the marginal products would lead
directly to the establishment of a combat effectiveness index.
24

The economic theory of production describes production processes
in terms of production functions. The general form of these production
functions is:
P = f(x-j ; x
2
; ... ; x
R
) Eq. 1
It states that a product (P) is a function of various inputs (x. ).
These inputs are capital- and labor-oriented. In the military environ-
ment, this could be interpreted as equipment and manpower, e.g., tanks
or aircraft and soldiers.
One of the many possible forms of this production function is
linear:
P = cux, + cux + ••• + a x Eq. 2
2 2 n n
The firepower-score with its linear quality can be viewed as one applica-
tion of Eq. 2. The variables are assumed to be independent from each
other and there exists infinite substitution elasticity between them.
For more details concerning linear production functions, see Nicholson
[Ref. 13, Chapter 7J. There exist two possible explanations for the
linear form of the production function:
- as it stands. The variables are independent and the coeffi-
cients are the marginal products. This implies perfect sub-




- from the application of linear programming techniques. If
seen in this context, it would be assumed that to get an out-
put, the inputs must be used in certain, fixed proportions,
in concordance with the ratios of the coefficients to each
other. As an example for this interpretation in the military
environment, one could perceive that a carrier task force has
to consist of two attack carriers, three frigates, six destroy-
ers and so on Ref. 1: p. 81 .
Most production functions are of nonlinear form as shown below:
a, cu a










with 2JEL- .... 2E_> n
l n
and 9!|; .... 3!e<
8x^ 3x^
One special form of Eq. 3 is known as Cobb-Douglas production
function. It is named after C. W. Cobb and P. H. Douglas [Ref. 14: p. 132]








This equation has proved to be quite useful for many applications, since
it can be changed into a linear form:
log P = log A + a, log x-, + culog x
?
Considering x, to represent equipment inputs and x
2
to represent manpower
inputs, a, and ot« are then the elasticities of output with respect to
26

equipment and manpower respectively. The constants a, and ou can some-
times be estimated from actual data and the principal form of the produc-
tion function can be established. For more details, see Nicholson
[Ref. 13: p. 199] .
The military decision-makers of all times have been concerned--
knowingly or not--with the estimation of the form and the coefficients
of the military production function. Carl von Clausewitz (1780 - 1831)
writes [Ref. 2, Chapter 13]:
"...since a squadron of 150 horses, a battalion of 800 soldiers and a
battery of 8 six-pounders cost equally in procurement as well as in
operating cost, the question is... how to find the optimal ratio between
them,.
.
.since it seems trivial to notice that only a mixture of all




When he reports that the most successful "force mix" of his time was to
employ one eight-gun battery per one thousand to three thousand infantrists
and about one quarter as many cavalry as there was infantry, he really
assigned certain values to the coefficients of the linear form of the
military production function and took into account the relative cost of
the respective weapon systems.
Presently, the trend goes towards replacing manpower by equip-
ment to reduce costs and meet certain other constraints. The large-
scale implementation of this replacement policy implies the widely
shared believe that there exist high substitution elasticities between
capital-intensive force elements and manpower-intensive ones. In less
complicated language, this means that one can do a certain task equally
well using certain equipment when using a certain amount of soldiers.
Some force planners do not share this belief. The former German Air
Force General Steinhoff warns: "Those who come to rely too much on
27

technology may find one morning that an army clad in skins and wielding
clubs has captured them, lock, stock and Laser".
The widespread use of the linear form of the military production
function has many reasons. It is relatively simple and transparent in
suggesting that the output is the sum of the inputs which are weighted by
a factor representing the marginal capabilities. The weights are fre-
quently determined by judgment and experience and unfortunately not by
thorough analysis. However, it can be easily recognized that military
production processes are not linear as the use of this form of the pro-
duction function might imply. The marginal products are frequently
diminishing when the corresponding inputs increase above certain limits.
On the other hand, some inputs may require a certain minimum input level
to generate any output at all. One realization of this reasoning will
be presented later in this thesis as a proposed improvement in the SAM-
suppression module (see Chapter V.A.). Diminishing returns, as well as
the opposite effect described above, can be modelled mathematically by
the use of an exponential -additive form of the production function,





P » a,x, + . • . + a x Eq. 511 n n ^
For 6 between Zero and One, the resulting function is concave, indi-
cating diminishing returns. The other possibility mentioned above can
be depicted by a convex-concave shape of the production function.
Establishing the military production function in its complete
form is not a trivial task at all, because:
28

- one has to determine the form and the coefficients of the
function by empirical means. The necessary data for this
endeavor cannot be found directly, since wars are not waged,
at least not in our democratic society, just to collect
data. The primary feasible means to find these data are
field trials, exercises and combat modelling. Based on
these data, a reasonable estimation can take place to find
the form and the coefficients of the function.
- the change of technology shifts the military production
function in an unknown way, which necessitates a new evalua-
tion.
Stockfisch reasons that military production processes are fre-
quently multipicative [Ref. lj . His argument is that the common under-
standing of expressions like "combined arms" and "joint operations"
imply that the respective processes are nonlinear and multiplicative.
The general form of this function is shown below:
Pi Po P





In this form, the marginal capability of each input depends on the re-
spective levels of all inputs.
All the forms of the military production function presented
above model military processes as if they were absorbed by a market.
The reasoning behind military buildup is, however--at least in the
understanding of the writer of this thesis--not to let this "market"
happen. Additionally, this approach to the establishment of the
29

military production function needs to be modified to represent an
aspect mentioned earlier: interactions do not only exist between the
different inputs of one side, but also between one side and the inputs
of the possible adversaries. To include this aspect, the following






, yr ... ,ym ) Eq. 7
where the x. and y. represent the inputs of the opposing forces.
It is apparently not at all trivial to find the proper form of
the military production function. Even if one takes the simplest,
linear form--as depicted in Equation 2--using the firepower-score repre-
sentation and modelling attrition with a Lanchester-type approach, the
task is not easier. As Taylor points out, the solution by analytical
methods is essentially impossible [Ref. 15]. He shows that analytical
solutions require the assumption of homogeneity of forces and that for
heterogeneous forces, analytical methods are feasibly only if the at-
trition rates—represented by their coefficients—are constant.
30

III. THE TACTICAL AIR WAR ANALYSIS GAME (TAWAG)
A. GENERAL APPROACH AND MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The Tactical Air War Analysis Game (TAWAG) was designed by Taylor
and Huber in 1979 [Ref. 7] as a hierarchically structured "quick" game
to be used as a cursory tool to check long-range air armament policy
options within the context of high-intensity conventional war in Cen-
tral Europe. The game was later developed at the Federal Armed Forces
University (Hochschule der Bundeswehr) in Munich, West Germany, and is
presently implemented on a Burroughs B 7700/162 computer system. The
programming language was PL/1 in the form of IBM-F-level.
TAWAG should aid in the two interdependent decision-making processes,
firstly concerned with the efficiency of deployment of existing Air
Forces and secondly with the long-range planning of future force struc-
tures. Earlier models used for these purposes used the amount of
ordnance delivered as measurement of effectiveness (MOE). Based on the
word of Clausewitz that: "war is an act of violence to force our will
onto the enemy..." [Ref. 2: p. 89], the main purpose of an Air Force
can only be the support of the ground forces in combat. Since the pri-
mary objective of combat is to deny the enemy the possibility to invade
the country permanently, a reasonable MOE is the relative position of
the frontline to the situation at the beginning of the war. In TAWAG,
this frontline is called Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA).
TAWAG is an antagonistic multi-stage game which consists of two
interacting war-models: the air war and the ground war module. The
























FIGURE 5: Basic Model Structure
The defender tries to minimize the effects of the opponent's
attack in such a way as to prevent him from gaining ground, whereas
the attacker tries to maximize just that. The inputs to the models
are data related to the respective air- and ground-resources, e.g.,
air weapon systems and their probabilities of success or ground forces
and their capabilities as represented by firepower-indices. Addi-
tionally, ground-operation policies like deployment or breakpoints are
determined beforehand and used as inputs stored in the data base. In
the original, the intermediate output, the FEBA-movement, is used as
additional input for the air model, to be used to find the "optimal"
air war strategy. The present version does not contain the optimizer
module, so that the output of the MOE (FEBA-movement) is not fed back
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into the air war model. Additionally, the air war strategies are input
variables rather than output of the air war model in the latter version
of TAWAG. Figure 6 shows the new model structure.
A Lanchester-type attrition is used to model the reduction of the
number of air war systems during the course of the war and a firepower-















FIGURE 6: Present Model Structure
The reason why the optimizer module was deleted in the second
version of TAWAG was mainly a time-economic one. To ensure that an
optimum is achieved for the air war strategy, it is necessary to check
all possible strategies. To show what dimensions can easily be reached,
one should consider the following example. If each opponent has only
five possible strategies to choose from in every stage of the game and if
the war is modelled to last for ten cycles only, the total number of







= 9.5367432 • 10 13
s
This example shows that it is very time-consuming to perform a total
enumeration of all possible strategies. In fact: a run of the origi-
nal model on the computer system mentioned above showed that a run with
only three air war systems and only one air war cycle per combat day
consumed 48 CPU-hours [Ref. 16: p. 16]. Seitz proposes one possibility
to reduce these excessive running times [ibid.] . The model determines
one initial strategy for the first cycle and this strategy is held con-
stant throughout the conflict. This version can be applied when the
battle-development is to be evaluated using constant strategies and con-
stant ground battle time when the air war duration is being varied, in
other words: find the effect of prolonged air war on the FEBA-movement.
The present version considers different predetermined strategies for
each "round" of the conflict. The set of these strategies is part of
the data base. There exists no guarantee that an "optimal" strategy can
be found using this approach. A different possibility to reduce running
time by reducing the number of computations so that the optimizer module
may be feasible again will be proposed in Chapter VI.
B. THE AIR WAR MODEL
1 . Basic Assumptions
In the present model, each opponent can have up to six different
types of air war systems, one of which can be unmanned, like a Cruise
Missile. The number of air bases is variable and can be predetermined
in the data base. Each air base can host only one type of weapon system
at a time. The variables influencing the capabilities of an air base

















supply- and maintenance-facilities. All these variables can be changed
in value by air attacks and are regenerated at a certain predetermined
rate. The aircraft parameters relevant to the model are type, number
and capabilities and its possible and actual missions. Each opponent
has air-defense in form of surface-to-air missiles deployed in his rear
region. These sites can be directly attacked and possibly destroyed or
jammed by electronical countermeasures. They are regenerated similarly
to the airbases. There is no regeneration necessary after electronical
jamming.
2. Air Missions and Weapon Systems
The air war model of TAWAG considers the following missions for
air war systems: (for a more detailed description including the mathe-
matical formulae, see Huber and Taylor [Ref. 7]).
a. Offensive Counter Air Role (OCA)
- Surface-to-Air-Missile Suppression (SAS)
The attack on opposing surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites
is the first step within each cycle. Attacks are always
initialized by SAS. The amount of SAM-suppression de-
pends on the number of attacking air war systems and is
determined by the use of suitable curves that are incre-
mentally stored in the data base (FORTRAN-version). The
curve actually used in the present model seems unrealistic
and a modification will be proposed in Chapter V.
- Air Base Attack (ABA)
Attacking the enemies' airfields is the second step in each
cycle. The goal of this attack is to reduce the number of
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aircraft able to start by destroying the runways and the
logistical support.
b. Offensive Air Support Role (OAS)
- Close Air Support (CAS)
The goal of close air support is to inflict losses to the
enemy in the vicinity of the frontline, similar to the
effect of artillery fire, so that the ground forces will
achieve superiority.
- Interdiction (INT)
This mission is designed to inflict losses on the reserves
or on the "second echelon". It does not show instantan-
eous results, but reduces the combat-capabilities of re-
serves on their march to the frontline, so that less
firepower will reach the battlefield.
c. Defensive Counter Air Role (DCA)
- Interception for Air Base Defense (ABD)
This role is designed to fight against weapon systems per-
forming ABA.
- Battlefield Defense (BFD)
This mission counters weapon systems trying to perform INT-
and CAS-missions.
- Escort for Air Base Attack (EBA)
EBA increases the probability of success for ABA-missions.
- Escort for Interdiction (EIN)
EIN increases the probability of success for INT-missions.
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Each of the air war systems --depending on the type— is capable of per-
forming one or more of these different missions. The possible roles and
missions and some examples of deployable weapon systems are depicted in
Table III.
3. Survivability and Probability of Success
The probability of success and the survivability are functions of
the respective missions. Both are used to calculate the results and
effects of the different air war efforts. For the mathematical formulae,
see Taylor and Huber [Ref. 7] . The following events are possible during
the performance of a mission and have influence on its result:
El: system survives its mission and is successful
E2: system survives its mission but misses the target
E3: system is "killed" during mission before weapon delivery
E4: system survives an attack on its base but is not able to
start for its mission
E5: system is destroyed on the ground
Parallel to these events, one can establish the following possibilities:
P~: probability of survival on the ground
P-ri probability for take-off
P<.: probability of survival enroute to target
Pq: probability of target detection
The use of the probability of target detection implies the assumption
that once a target is detected, it will certainly be destroyed. This
does not represent the present state of targeting technology. The user
of TAWAG has to be aware of this fact unless he uses it to model future































































A mission is modelled to be successful, if and only if the
event El takes place. Figure 8 can be used to verify this. The








For a proposed enrichment, see Chapter V.
D
FIGURE 8: Mission Events
TAWAG models two different types of attack-missions against
opposing air weapon systems:
- general ABA, where all air weapon systems allocated to ABA-




- concentrated ABA, where all ABA-allocated systems are used
against one specified weapon system [Ref. 18: p. 40]
.
If damage is assessed, a temporary reduction of air war capabilities
is imposed on the opponent.
Air weapon systems of type 6 (e.g., Cruise Missiles) do not
survive an assigned mission and can therefore be used only once. As
stated above, ABA-missions can have a detrimental effect, the same ef-
fect that can be achieved against air-defense systems (SAM). The
amount of attrition of SAM depends upon the number of attacking air-
craft. A linearly decreasing function is used to assess the received
damage in terms of fractions of initial strength. After an attack, the
regeneration takes place with a predetermined rate per time-unit, until
the original strength is regained. A more realistic SAM-suppression
curve will be presented in Chapter V.
The effectiveness of air war systems depends on the availability
of logistics and maintenance support; as well as on the status of the
runways. This influence is modelled in the following way:
- the capacity of the logistic and maintenance support is in-
cluded in the establishment of the sortie-generation rate, and
- the capacity and availability of runways is included in the
probability of take-off.
Successful CAS and INT sorties against ground forces are directly




C. THE GROUND WAR MODEL
1. The Battlefield
The battlefield is divided into sectors, the number of which can
be specified by the user of TAWAG. The sectors can be thought to lie
parallel to the main direction of attack. The principal geometry of the
model is depicted in Figure 9.
The frontline (FEBA) is the line where the opposing ground
forces meet. Initially the FEBA is located on a demarcation line from
which the penetration is calculated in both directions. On both sides
of the FEBA are the respective combat regions. Ground combat takes
place exclusively within these regions. Adjacent to the combat regions
are the respective rear regions. Reserves or the "Second Echelons" have
to be assembled there prior to marching to the front.
As stated earlier, the task for the attacker is to maximize
penetration into the regions of the defender, and conversely, the task
for the defender is to minimize this penetration. Superimposed on the
geometrical model of the battlefield is a terrain model which divides
each sector into successive bands of three possible types of terrain




The terrain has an influence on positions and movement of
troops. Each sector can have its specific terrain-features, inde-
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FIGURE 9: Battlefield Geometry
FEBA
REAR REGION
FIGURE 10: Terrain Representation
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2. Combat Capabil ities
The ground war model considers each sector as an individual,
independent process. This means that the model cannot represent a con-
tinuous frontline, running through the borderlines between sectors.
The reasoning behind this modelling aspect is the desire to analyze the
influence of different tactics on an otherwise constant war model and to
be able to compare results directly without resorting to repeated runs.
At the beginning of a conflict, both sides have a certain number
of divisions to be employed. A division is the smallest unit con-
sidered in the ground war model. The capabilities of each division is
described by a firepower-index. The principles involved in the establish-
ment and the problems of the use of firepower-indices have been discussed
above. All divisions on each side have the same strength at the beginning
of a conflict. The divisions are placed at the front and in the rear
staging areas.
The total number of divisions will not change throughout the
battle, although their firepower-indices are subject to attrition. A
division can be in one of the following states [Ref. 17: p. 34]:
- disassembled in the rear region, which makes it invulnerable
to interdiction attacks;
- assembling in the staging area in the rear region, which makes
it susceptible to attacks;
- marching to the front, which makes it vulnerable by interdiction-
attacks;
- at the front, attacking, which makes it vulnerable to close air




- at the front, defending, which makes it vulnerable to close
air support and subjects it to attrition;
- at the front, retreating, which subjects it to the same
threats as described in the two cases above;
- replaced by reserve-divisions, which eliminates all threats
to attrition.
It is assumed that the divisions on one side (Y, "RED") are
replaced as a whole when their "strength" reaches a certain predeter-
mined level. (For details, see next Chapter.) In this way, all divi-
sions in one sector can be treated as one large unit as far as replacements
are concerned. The reserve divisions of the other side (X, "BLUE") are
moved to the front individually, as soon as they are assembled in the
staging area. This procedure necessitates the tracking and bookkeeping
of individual divisions on this side. The actual position of the troops
is relevant only if they are in a defensive role.
Only three classes of positions are modelled in TAWAG and have





Combat is modelled to consist of three processes:
- command and control
- attrition
- movement
Command and control is represented by a logic structure to
simulate tactical decisions. "Breakpoints" are used to establish the
45

points in time when a division can no longer attack and must change to a
defensive role. In each sector, one single mission is determined for all
Y-di visions, while individual missions have to be found for each X-
division. For calculational purposes, X-divisions with the same missions
are combined to one "unit" by adding their respective firepower-indices.









fpp! BREAKPOINT FOR AN ATTACKING UNIT
(MUST STOP ATTACK AND DEFEND)
f°*: BREAKPOINT FOR A DEFENDING UNITW (IF ATTACKED. UNIT MUST WITHDRAW)










-' tQHD : CALL FOR UNIT REPLACEMENT
tl. : UNIT REPLACED IF REPLACEMENT
"u AVAILABLE AT FRONT
fJJ : BREAKPOINT FOR AN ATTACKING UNITw (MUST STOP ATTACK AND OEFEND)
fgj: BREAKPOINT FOR DEFENDING UNIT
BP (IF ATTACKED. UNIT MUST WITHDRAW)
FIGURE 12: Unit Breakpoints for Y-Force and Committing of Reserves
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Using the assigned missions and the type of defensive positions
of the respective units, an engagement type is determined using the de-
pendencies depitcted in Table IV [Ref. 7: p. 54]
.
There are different possibilities to model attrition [Ref. 8].
TAWAG models two different types of attrition, the one caused by the
opponent's air war systems and the one inflicted by ground forces.
Enemy air attack (INT and CAS) --attrition is modelled in the
following way: each air war system has an assigned firepower-index
which it will "destroy" if its mission is successful. The total attri-
tion depends on the number of successful sorties and will be distributed
evenly among all opposing divisions. INT is modelled to be the only
reason of attrition in the rear region.
Attrition in the combat regions is calculated as a function of
the force ratio and the type of engagement. ATLAS-curves are used to
assess the daily casualties, depicted in Figure 14 [Ref. 8j.
FEBA-movement is dependent on the force-ratio, on the engagement
type and on the type of terrain within the combat zone. It is derived
from curves similar to those discussed by GOAD in: "The Modelling of
Movement in Tactical Games" [Ref. 5: p. 199]. It is important to
notice that these curves are difficult to verify and GOAD states that:
"The connection (to historical data)... is extremely tenuous, not to say
non-existent". As an illustration of the fact that analysts in differ-
ent nations develop and use widely varying movement rates, the figure
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FIGURE 13: Attacker Advance Rates
ATLAS
DIVISION CASUALTY RATES AS A FUNCTION OF FORCE RATO
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fashion:
FIGURE 14: ATLAS - Casualty Rates
The deployment of reserves is modelled in the following
- Y-reserves are initially scattered in the rear area, waiting




the front reach the level fCND (call for unit replacement), a
number of divisions equal to the ones fighting at the front is
assembled and started on the march to the front. The marching
speed is predetermined and their firepower-index is subject to
AY DY





reached, the front-divisions are replaced. If not, all reserve-
divisions have reached the front, the new firepower-index of Y
is averaged using that of the reserve-divisions and that of the
ones not replaced.
In contrast to the Y-divisions, the X-di visions in reserve reach
the rear area at a given rate. As soon as they arrive in this
area, they begin to assemble and after a predetermined time,
they march to the front. Their firepower-index is subject to
attrition. Arriving at the frontline, they replace the divi-
sions with the lowest firepower- index.
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IV. SYNOPSIS OF ATTEMPTS TO TRANSFER THE
TAWAG MODEL TO THE NPS-COMPUTER
The writer of this thesis was introduced to the concepts of TAWAG
in the early Summer of 1980, when he had the opportunity to talk with
Professor H. W. Hoffman (Federal Armed Forces University, Munich, W.
Germany) who was visiting the NPS at that time. The writer was inter-
ested in working on an operational model, especially as pertains to de-
fense planning in W. Germany, and was willing to accept the challenge
to implement TAWAG on the computer system of the NPS, although the
computer program was not too well documented. The distant possibility
that TAWAG could be used as a teaching device for combat-modelling
courses further invited the selection of this topic as thesis-work.
Professor James G. Taylor encouraged the writer to choose this subject
and made him aware of possible pitfalls.
The existing version of TAWAG used PL/1 as programming language,
of which the writer had only rudimental knowledge. Nevertheless, the
studies done during the Fall-quarter led to the detection of possibili-
ties for improvement and enrichments.
Knowing that the IBM-360 system of the NPS would be changed to the
newer 370-system, it was decided not to start programming until the new
system was installed and operational. Additionally, it was not known
at that time what implications the new system would have with respect
to the implementation of TAWAG. Although the new system brought improve-
ments for the user—especially the use of terminals with CRTs—those did
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not apply for PL/1 -programming which still had to be done in batch
processing. This was cumbersom, considering the size of the original
PL/1 -version of TAWAG. It consists of 4328 lines of code and needs
twelve data-files of considerable size and complexity.
For a few weeks during the Winter-quarter 1980, the feasibility of
a change of the programming language to SIMSCRIPT was checked. This
effort was abandoned in favor of the implementation of a FORTRAN-version,
based on a thesis by Droll [Ref. 1 8j . Four months (including the Summer-
break) were used to change the program to a form compatible with the
IBM-system in use at the NPS. During these efforts, it became apparent
that a program listing alone is not sufficient as a basis to implement a
complex computer model like TAWAG, since it does not show the peculiari-
ties of the computer system it comes from.
Based on these efforts, some suggestions are made in Chapter VI to
improve the general transferability of computer models and to help
alleviate these problems for future similar projects. In the first
weeks of the Summer-quarter 1981, it was decided to change the scope of
this thesis to its present form.
52

V. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS AND ENRICHMENTS
A. SAM-SUPPRESSION
As presented above, TAWAG models SAM-suppression-effects of SAS-
missions using a linear reduction function. The independent variable
of this function is the number of attacking air weapon systems (AWS),
the dependent variable is a number between Zero and One, representing




N represents the number of AWS necessary to reduce the effect of SAM-




Two objections to this way of modelling are presented here.
- In a real -world situation, only a few SAM-sites will be attacked
at a time, specifically those which are perceived as a major
threat along the main attacking routes. This is intended to in-
crease the probability of success for OCA and OAS missions. The
model should be modified to represent this type of attack-tactic.
- The linear form of the curve does not seem to represent the real
world either. One of the more successful ways to fight SAM-sites
is to saturate the fire-control capability, either electronically,
or by the sheer number of attackers. This implies that a minimum
number of AWS is necessary to cause some initial degrading effect.
Additionally, it can be perceived that the cumulative suppression-
effect is not linear, or more specific, that there is a reduction
in suppression-effectiveness for each additional attacker if their
number is increased. This leads to the proposed improvement.
The proposition is to change the reduction function to a nonlinear
form as depicted in Figure 16. The number n
E
represents the number of
AWS up to which no reduction of SAM-capabilities is noticeable. N is
the number of systems necessary to reduce the effectiveness of the SAM-
systems to Zero. The function between n
p
and N is convex (as seen from
below) to indicate the decreasing "rate of return" in effectiveness of
attackers.
Using the PL/1 -version of TAWAG, this suggested improvement is not
trivial to implement, since this version uses a closed form of this re-
duction function. An approximation of this closed form might be neces-
sary to establish. The present form of the applicable PL/; code is:
[Ref. 17: "card image listing"].





FIGURE 16: SAM-Suppression (Improved Version)
Using the FORTRAN-version of TAWA6, it is not necessary that the
exact mathematical form of the reduction-function is known, since it
is stored pointwise in the data base. However, the algorithm to find
the interpolated value of the reduction function imposes a severe limi-
tation to the proposed form. The relevant part of the algorithm in
FORTRAN-code is listed below [Ref. 18: p. 92].
STUETZ + YALT+(ANZ-XALT)*(Y-YALT)/(X-XALT)
The division by Zero which would occur as long as the number of AWS is
smaller than n
E
in the linear horizontal part of the proposed reduction
function can be avoided if this part of the reduction function is put
into the data base as a linear, slightly decreasing function, as de-




FIGURE 17: SAM-Suppression (FORTRAN-Version)
This way the present FORTRAN-version of TAWAG can be used essen-
tially unchanged. A different way to implementing the proposed im-
provement would necessitate an additional coded statement to check if
the number of attacking AWS is smaller than nr and if this is the case,
to return the value One for the reduction function.
B. SURVIVABILITIES OF AIR SYSTEMS
As stated above, the survivability of AWS--excluding type 6, which










This formula does not include the possibility that an aircraft is
shot down after successfully attacking the target. To include this
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possibility, the list of possible events should be changed to include
an event EO. The proposed event-list would look like this:
EO = successful attack, AWS does not survive return
El = system survives mission and is successful
(and so on, as shown in Chapter III)
The event El is used as before to assess attrition to the enemy, but
additional calculation is necessary to find the correct number of AWSs
available for future use. The actual formulation of this calculation
depends on the TAWAG- vers ion at hand and the programming language used.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Increased application of Operations/Research-methods for planning
problems on all levels of the military hierarchy has led to the develop-
ment of a great (and ever increasing) number of complex models. If a
user does not have a thorough understanding of all assumptions and im-
plications, erroneous conclusions can be drawn and may conflict with
results achieved from other models. It is therefore absolutely crucial
that adequate documentation exists, if a model is to be used by anybody
else but its developer, especially if it is fairly complex, since in-
creased complexity results in diminished transparency. The author's ex-
periences in this thesis effort support the importance of this demand.
Szymczak [Ref. 19: p. 72] has proposed that three different types
of documentation be established before an attempt is made to transfer a
model
:
- a non-technical model description for decision-makers,
- extensive conceptual-technical documentation for analysts, and
- technical information for those programmers who try to transfer
a model to a different computer.
Establishing these three different sets of documentation and their
update is often perceived as a tedious, unnecessary task, especially
during the development-phase of a model. However, the lack of one of
them may well lead to such problems, that the efforts to transfer a
model are abandoned and a new modelling effort is started from scratch.
Considering this costly alternative, the establishment of proper docu-
mentation seems to be worthwhile.
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The author feels that more work should be done on the selection of
criteria by which air operations are evaluated, i.e., the MOEs used for
optimization in TAWAG. Currently, TAWAG uses FEBA-movement as single
MOE. As pointed out earlier, the functional connection between force-
ratio and front-movement is difficult to establish. Therefore, it
seems to be reasonable to include losses or loss rates as additional
MOE, since a combination of occupied ground and total numerical losses
or loss rates determine the willingness of each opponent to end combat
actions. Dupuy has suggested three MOEs to quantify battle outcomes
[Ref. 20: p. 42]:
- the extent to which each side accomplished the assigned or per-
ceived mission,
- the ability of each side to gain or hold ground, and
- the efficiency with which each side did these two things in
terms of casualties.
The author suggests further investigation, possibly using the consider-
ations mentioned above as a point of departure, of the evaluation cri-
teria in TAWAG.
One drawback of the present version of TAWAG is the inability to
find the optimal strategy--if it exists. In the first model, the
optimal strategy was found in the optimizer-part by means of total
enumeration of all strategies. This part has been deleted from TAWAG
to reduce running time to a feasible length and to be able to prede-
termine strategies. An inclusion of a "filter" to eliminate impossible
strategies could reduce the total number of alternatives to be checked
in such a way as to regain feasibility of running time. Additionally,
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it could be possible to achieve shorter running times by employing a
different method of optimization.
Special attention should be focused on the establishment of the
data base for TAWAG. Using the original data base, Haardt [Ref. 17: p. 202]
found out that CAS-sorties have no measurable effect on the FEBA-movement.
This seems counter-intuitive. He traced this back to the choice of cer-
tain values in the data base. It could also possibly be attributed to the
fact that CAS does not have a direct influence on rate of FEBA-movement
(i.e., a shortfall of model formulation). The author suggests that the
reason for this "anomality" should be investigated.
Combat modelling is a potentially very valuable tool, although its
use can cause a lot of controversy. Some of the problems and possible
pitfalls have been pointed out in Chapter II. Knowing and evaluating
these problems, a military analyst can gain insights in the nature of
war and the interdependabil ities of the factors contributing to it.
It seems important to notice again that combat modelling itself does
not make decisions, but that it can influence and assist decision-
makers by making them aware of trade-offs and cost-differences between
alternatives. Results of model-runs can be misleading if apparent or
implied assumptions are unrealistic, or if some essential constraints
are unknown or uncertain. The latter is specifically valid for the
prognostic character of data used to evaluate future weapon systems in
time frames of ten or twenty years. This implication of uncertainty
is always one element of planning—if one uses operations research
methods or not—and the military decision-maker has to live with it.
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Another frequently encountered problem should be mentioned in passing:
the reliability of modelling results is also dependent on asking the
"right" questions.
The biggest problem, however, seems to be the link of communication
between the analyst and the decision-maker. As Hoz points out (in:
Huber [Ref. 5: p. 219]), trust in the method and comprehension of
models in use can improve this communication.
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